Bridging the Conceptual Gap Between Law and Morality: A Critical Response to H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept Of Law by Morin, K
BRIDGING THE CONCEPTUAL GAP BETWEEN LAW AND
MORALITY: A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO H.L.A. HART'S THE
CONCEPT OF LA W
Kaila Morin
Abstract - In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart develops his theory for a concept of
law that rejects the possibility of a necessary connection between law and morality-
i.e., what the law is from what the law ought to be. He admittedly does so for moral
reasons. If there is a conceptual gap between law and morality, it is possible to use the
latter as a critical standard for assessing the law by questioning 'is this law too
iniquitous to obey or apply?' However, this concept of law is flawed. If the human
capacity for moral reason can be used to correctly identify and disobey legally valid
though morally deplorable laws, one must assume that belief in what the law ought to
be is an inherently moral aspect of the internal point of view. Furthermore, unless one
chooses to acknowledge the suppositions of command theory-that is, that law is
nothing more than habitual congruencies or the command of a supreme sovereign-
one must assume Hart's idea of the ultimate rule of recognition as an external
statement of fact relating to societies internal perspective of what ought to be. In this
way, the inclusion of the internal perspective as a necessary aspect of law entails a
connection between law and morality. Otherwise, what law is and what law ought to
be become synonymous under a merely external viewpoint. This does not reflect the
reality of how individuals assess the law or their actions in relation to the law.
A. INTRODUCTION
First published in 1961, legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart constructs a
comprehensive argument for his positivist concept of law in The Concept
of Law. Hart affirms that his aim is not to conceptualize and prescribe a
definition of law, but to 'further the understanding of law, coercion, and
morality as different but related social phenomena." Accordingly, Hart
underlines three important areas of inquiry: 'How does law differ from
and how is it related to orders backed by threats? How does legal
obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral obligations? What
are rules and to what extent is law an affair of rules?' 2 Via this descriptive
approach, Hart advances his concept of law by refuting the idea of
1HLA Hart, The Concept ofLaw (2nd edn, OUP 1997) vi.
2 ibid 13.
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coercion in Austin's command theory while also providing for the
possibility of a positivist separation between what law is and what law
ought to be. This second aspect of Hart's theory-the separation thesis-
has generated notable controversies (particularly, the Fuller-Hart and
Dworkin-Hart debates), and arguably remains his most problematic
*3
conceptual premise.
In this paper, I will add to the Fuller/Dworkin side of the debate on
morality and law by providing a further response to Hart's concept of
law. Although Hart provides a thorough justification for the reality and
desirability of this distinction, his argument is susceptible to additional
counter-arguments relating to two logical inconsistencies in his
reasoning. First, the concepts of law and morality are necessarily bound
provided that Hart yields to his theory of law as a system of rules rather
than a system of orders backed by threats. By recognizing the human
capacity for moral reason, Hart provides for the moral character of the
internal viewpoint. The internal aspect of rules-which distinguishes a
rule from a habit-indicates that the ultimate rule of recognition emerges
from this internal viewpoint as a first step from the pre-legal into the legal
world.4 Given that the validity of law is an internal statement itself
recognizing the rule of recognition, Hart links the validity of law to
morality.! Second, requirements under the primary rules of obligation
conflict with Hart's concept of a law too iniquitous to obey. These
contradictory assertions necessarily provide for the moral nature of law as
3 For a better understanding of Hart's separation thesis, see Hart, Concept of Law (n 1)
vi: 'law, coercion, and morality as different but related social phenomena.' See also
HLA Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71:4 Harvard
Law Review 593. Hart distinguishes his separation thesis from those of Bentham and
Austin, 'which deserved criticism' as they insisted on a complete separation between
law and morality, and rather maintains that - while law need not coincide with
morality in order to be valid ('[1]aws, however morally iniquitous, would still (so far
as this point is concerned) be laws') - law and morality are interrelated in that the
later may be used to criticize the former. This is key to Hart's concept of law, and to
legal positivism in general. Although a number of prominent positivist theorists
maintain that law and morality are related, legal positivism entails that law need not
satisfy ideals of morality. Legal positivism views law as a procedurally generated
social construction, therefore its existence as law is entirely separate from the merit of
its content. In this sense, legal positivism must accept the idea that valid law need not
adhere to moral values.
4 Hart, Concept ofLaw (n 1) 56, 94.
5 ibid 104-105.
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a system of rules.
To begin, I will describe and assess Hart's concept of law in the
following section. I will then provide a more detailed analysis of the
logical inconsistencies in Hart's theory in order to bridge the conceptual
gap between law and morality. It is crucial to note that this response does
not assume that morality includes 'all sorts of extra-legal notions about
'what ought to be,' regardless of their sources, pretensions, or intrinsic
worth.' 6 Moral values are best understood as those governing inter-
personal relations in a way that prevents the instrumentalization of others,
and upholds for them a standard of treatment that one would wish for
oneself. Furthermore, I acknowledge that moral and legal rules are
distinct, and that both the obligations they impose and the sanctions they
warrant differ. However, this distinction does not itself provide for the
separation of law and morality; a necessary connection does not imply
that all moral rules are law, but merely requires that all legal rules
conform to moral values - i.e., that valid law cannot be immoral.8
6 Lon L Fuller, 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart' (1958)
71:4 Harvard Law Review 630, 635.
7 Hart, Concept of Law (n 1) 86. Hart's assessment of law and morality generally
focuses on the distinction between moral and legal obligations in order to defend the
separation thesis.
8 Like John Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights (OUP 1980) 9-18, I argue that
the internal point of view must consider moral concerns in its assessment of the law,
thereby ensuring a connection between law and morality. While Finnis does so using
Aristotle's work on the central case and focal meaning, both positions maintain the
connection between law and morality, even in laws with no particular moral content,
or which have been adopted for self-interested reasons, by stating that these are
secondary to the moral central case, or must correspond with the moral assessment of
the internal viewpoint and cannot be deemed 'too iniquitous to obey'. However, there
are some key distinctions between Finnis' argument and those forwarded in this essay.
For one, Finnis conflates Hart's internal viewpoint with Raz's legal viewpoint, which
I maintain are distinct. The legal viewpoint-through which people make detached
normative statements on what the law is, and how they should act in relation to it-
presupposes the existence of valid legal norms or a legal system, and does not
effectively provide for their internal assessment by those who use and follow them
(see footnote 28). Although both viewpoints can work concomitantly, the internal
point of view takes precedence over the legal, as it more correctly reflects the reality
of how those who use the law also assess it in order to determine their and others'
behaviour by questioning whether a law is 'too iniquitous to obey'. An understanding
of the internal viewpoint as distinct from the legal more effectively provides for the
moral aspect of the internal viewpoint, as it is possible to conceive of an amoral legal
viewpoint through which one adopts a detached normative statement of legal facts to
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B. HART'S CONCEPT OF LAW
In a thorough attempt to descriptively analyze law and its separation from
morality, Hart provides the conceptual framework for his theory of law as
a system of rules rather than a system of orders backed by threats. Having
identified and critically assessed the basic elements of Austin's
imperative theory, Hart finds that 'the simple model of law as the
sovereign's coercive orders failed to reproduce some of the salient
features of a legal system.' 9 The simple elements of commands and habits
do not effectively account for some laws-namely power conferring laws
and legal customs-, and fail to reproduce the features of continuity and
universal applicability found in modern legal systems. Therefore, Hart
affirms that law is not the gunman situation writ large; these features can
only be found in the idea of a rule.
Contrasting the simple elements of commands and habits, Hart
maintains that the idea of a rule is by no means a simple one. In order to
accurately illustrate the complexity of a legal system, Hart claims that it is
first necessary to discriminate between two different though related types
of rules. 'Rules of the first type impose duties [primary rules of
obligation]; rules of the second type confer powers, public or private
[secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication].' 10 The union
of these rules is central to Hart's concept, although it is not a necessary
precondition for the existence of law. Accordingly, Hart affirms:
[I]n the combination of these two types of rule there lies what Austin wrongly
claimed to have found in the notion of coercive orders, namely 'the key to the
science of jurisprudence'. [However] [w]e shall not indeed claim that
wherever the word 'law' is 'properly' used this combination of primary and
secondary rules is to be found; for it is clear that the diverse range of cases of
which the word 'law' is used are not linked by any such simple uniformity
determine his or her behaviour, regardless of the 'practical reasonableness' of
morality. I also relate the moral aspect of the internal viewpoint and notions of a law
'too iniquitous to obey' to the notion of obligation as a necessary aspect of a legal rule
in order to further demonstrate that immoral laws (those which one is not obligated to
follow) cannot be said to exist as valid legal rules. This more effectively proves a
connection between valid legal rules and moral values. Finnis' account allows for the
validity of immoral laws, regardless of how practically unreasonable they might be.
9 Hart, Concept ofLaw (n 1) 79.
10 ibid 81.
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Under this model, the word 'law' can be 'properly' used in the absence of
secondary rules, however, for law to exist, human conduct must in some
sense be 'non-optional or obligatory' (i.e., the legal subject must in some
sense feel bound by primary rules of obligation that restrict certain types
of conduct).12 For this reason, Hart acknowledges that it is possible to
imagine a primitive society in which social control is limited to the
internalization of its primary rules of obligation.1 3 This social structure
'of primary rules of obligation' can only exist in a small community
'closely knit by ties of kinship, common sentiment, and belief, and placed
in a stable environment.'1 4 Under any other condition, emerging problems
of uncertainty and inefficiency are exacerbated by the static character of
the primary rules and are only remedied by the secondary rules of
recognition, adjudication and change.
Hart further contrasts between the idea of a rule and the elements
of commands and habits by separating the legal validity of rules from the
physical power of their authors. According to Hart, the validity of a rule
is determined by reference to accepted rules of recognition. Rules of
recognition cannot themselves be valid, only accepted, because they
'cannot meet tests stipulated by a more fundamental rule."' Courts and
others who accept as appropriate certain rules of recognition use these in
order to make an internal statement on the legal validity of particular
rules. In this sense, the rule of recognition-which can neither be asserted
by a sovereign nor accepted as habitual obedience, but is rather shown to
exist in the way laws are identified-serves as a kind of gateway into a
system of modem law. The rule of recognition-shown to exist as a
matter of fact through its usage and acceptance in identifying valid laws
through the internal viewpoint-is ultimate in the identification of valid
law, not the sovereign. This contradicts the elements of command theory
" ibid.
12 See Hart, Concept of Law, ibid 82, 91. Note that Hart distinguishes between the
assertion that someone had an obligation to do something and the assertion that
someone was obliged to do it in his portrayal of law as obligatory.
13 ibid 91, see also at 56. The conscious acceptance of social rules as correct standards
for behaviour is called 'the internal aspect of rules.' This distinguishes a rule from a
habit.
14 ibid 92.
15 ibid 100-107.
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and habitual obedience.
Of course, in his theory of law as a system of rules, Hart attempts
to 'further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different
but related phenomena.'l 6 As a result, his concept of law also seeks to
reject the possibility of a necessary connection between law and
morality-i.e., what the law is from what the law ought to be. Hart
admittedly does so for moral reasons. If there is a conceptual gap between
law and morality, it is possible to use the latter as a critical standard for
assessing the law by questioning, 'This is law but [is it] too iniquitous to
obey or apply?'"7 In this sense, the legal subject can more effectively
assess what the law is according to an internal statement of what the law
ought to be, and use this assessment in deciding whether or not to obey.
Hart forwards several arguments in support of this distinction,
many of which I will now dismiss. For one, Hart's attempt to disentangle
justice-specifically the precept of treating 'like cases alike' from the
general spheres of law and morality is not relevant to this assessment. In
order to provide an accurate understanding of law in relation to morality,
the concept of morality must be considered in its entirety. Therefore, it
would be counter-productive to limit this response to a particular kind of
morality. Furthermore, Hart maintains that legal rules are different than,
and therefore separate from, moral rules as they impose distinct
obligations and warrant more severe sanctions.' 8 While true, this
argument is also irrelevant. It falsely assumes the conflation of moral and
legal rules. The connection of law and morality does not imply that all
moral rules are law; it merely requires that valid laws are not immoral.
Hart's argument relating to the nature of purely procedural laws is
also extraneous to this assessment. Although more relevant, it cannot
invalidate the connection between legal validity and morality, and is
therefore dismissed. In his postscript, Hart responds to Dworkin in an
attempt to uphold his claim that 'there are no necessary conceptual
connections between the content of law and morality." 9 He argues that, in
addition to morally iniquitous laws, 'there can be legal rights and duties
16 ibid vi (emphasis added).
17 ibid 210.
" ibid 86, 169-170.
19 ibid 268.
125
Bridging the Conceptual Gap Between Law and Morality
which have no moral justification or force whatever.' 2 0 However, this
argument also falsely assumes the conflation of moral and legal rules. A
necessary connection does not imply that all laws are moral rules; it
merely requires that valid laws are not immoral. The procedural rule is
only valid if it is not immoral. Its content does not itself need to be moral.
Moreover, Hart does not sufficiently maintain this argument. In a
separate article, Terry Nardin adopts the Kantian perspective of morality
while describing its relation to law; 'The word 'moral' in this context
signals a non-instrumental relationship in which human beings treat one
another not as obstacles to be overcome or resources to be used, but as
persons whose autonomy should be respected.' 2 1 Understood in this way,
even purely procedural rules are in some sense moral as they regulate our
interactions in order to ensure the non-instrumentalization of other
individuals. Therefore, it is not possible to assume the amoral quality of
such rules.
Hart's most important argument for the distinction between law
and morality relates to his notion of a 'wicked law'. In an attempt to
justify both the reality and the desirability of a separation, Hart makes the
following empirical assumption:
[I]t scarcely seems that an effort to train and educate men in the use of a
narrower concept of legal validity, in which there is no place for valid but
morally iniquitous laws, is likely to lead to a stiffening of resistance to evil, in
the face of threats of organized power, or a clearer realization of what is
morally at stake when obedience is demanded. So long as human beings can
gain sufficient co-operation from some to enable them to dominate others,
they will use the forms of law as one of their instruments. Wicked men will
enact wicked rules which others will enforce. 22
Accordingly, Hart implies that morally iniquitous law is not only real, but
also inevitable. He also assumes that wicked law is most effectively
remedied by the separation of law and morality. Referring specifically to
the laws of slave-owning societies, as well as the nearer parallels of Nazi
Germany and South Africa, Hart argues that this separation is necessary
20 ibid.
21 Terry Nardin, 'Emergency logic: prudence, morality and the rule of law' in Victor
Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge University Press
2008) 97.
22 Hart, Concept ofLaw (n 1) 210.
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in order to prevent the perversion of morality under a system of wicked
laws, and to empower legal subjects with the ability to defy 'laws that are
too iniquitous to obey.' 23
C. LAW WITHOUT MORALITY: THE FALLACIES OF A LAW TOO
INIQUITOUS TO OBEY
In his concept of law, Hart purposefully analyzes the resemblances and
differences between law and morality in order to provide for the
separation of these long-entangled ideas. As a result, the theoretical
framework for his concept of law as a system of rules aims to refute the
possibility of a necessary connection between law and morality. This
way, the legal subject can assess what the law is in relation to what the
law ought to be by questioning, 'is this law too iniquitous to obey or
apply?' If yes, the wicked law can be broken, however it remains law.
The separation between law and morality designates that iniquitous law
remains valid law, and that noncompliance 'merely means that human
beings do not do what they are told to do.' 24 As I will now argue, this
concept of law is logically unsound, making it susceptible to two counter-
arguments based on the reasoning in Hart's theoretical framework.
Although Hart aims to separate law from morality, the contradictory
aspects of his concept necessarily provide for the moral nature of law as a
system of rules.
1. The Concepts of Law and Morality are Necessarily Bound
provided that Hart Yields to His Theory of Law as a System of Rules
rather than a System of Orders backed by Threats
According to Hart, rules are different from the simple elements of
commands and habits because of their internal aspect. A rule (in lieu of a
command or a habit) exists either if it has been validated by a previously
accepted rule of recognition, or if its acceptance is shown through its use
as a common standard of behaviour.2 5 Under both instances, the rule must
be internally acknowledged (contrasting the idea of a habit), and either
directly or indirectly-through validation under a previously accepted
23 ibid 200.
24 ibid 187.
25 ibid 56-57.
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rule-accepted (contrasting the idea of a command). This is only
achieved when the subjects of a particular rule adopt an internal
viewpoint-that is, 'the view of those who do not merely record and
predict behaviour conforming to rules [external viewpoint], but use the
rules as standards for the appraisal of their own and others'
behaviour'-in order to critically reflect on it.2 6 More specifically, Hart
26 ibid 56-57, 98. Although similar, Hart's internal viewpoint differs slightly from
Raz's legal point of view. See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979) 153-
157, as well as Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (OUP 2002) 170-177. The
legal viewpoint-through which people make detached normative statements on what
the law is, and how they should act in relation to it-presupposes the existence of
valid legal norms or a legal system, and does not effectively provide for their internal
assessment by those who use and follow them. It is inherently legal in that the law is
meant to underscore the standards for ones behaviour; it provides for an assessment of
what 'ought' to be a person's behaviour based solely on the law. Hart's internal
viewpoint provides for an extra-legal standard of assessment in determining one's
own or others' behaviour through the question 'is this law too iniquitous to obey?'-
i.e., people must first question whether a law is too iniquitous to obey in order to
assess what 'ought' to be a one's behaviour.
While both Raz and Hart maintain that a valid legal system does not require
'that its norm subjects are ideal law-abiding citizens or that they should be so' (Raz,
Practical Reason 171), but merely that 'at least the officials of the system [...] accept
its laws and follow them' (Raz, Authority of Law 155) (this does provide for some
level of dissent with regard to the law), the internal viewpoint allows for even officials
of the legal system to stray from laws deemed too iniquitous to obey, thereby
invalidating it, whereas the legal viewpoint does not. Under the internal viewpoint,
any individual who deems a law too iniquitous to obey-even the officials of a
system-can choose not to uphold it as an appropriate standard of behaviour because
of this internal assessment, whereas a judge who adopts the legal point of view must
acknowledge what the law is, and assess behaviour in relation to this.
Indeed, only when viewed as distinct and together can these viewpoints
provide for the case of the anarchist judge described by Raz (Raz, Practical Reason
148). Under this conception, what the anarchist judge chooses to uphold would differ
depending on whether he adheres to the legal viewpoint or the internal viewpoint; he
could determine that the law is too iniquitous to obey under the internal viewpoint, or
could maintain that the law is a valid law and insist on its being upheld under the legal
viewpoint. This marks a very slight but key distinction between the two viewpoints.
Although both can work concomitantly, Hart's internal point of view is considered
here as it more correctly reflects the reality of how those who use the law also assess
it in order to determine their and others' behaviour, and therefore takes precedence
over the legal. See for example cases where the law is deemed immoral and is
therefore resisted by the oppressed, or the case of Nazi Germany, where the law was
immoral yet followed and accepted by many. These laws, which were initially upheld,
were shown to have been invalid after the fact through ex post facto criminal
sentencing due to their immorality. While it is true that the internal viewpoint may be
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affirms:
What is necessary is that there be a critical reflective attitude to certain
patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that this should display itself
in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in
acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are justified, all of which
find their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of 'ought',
'must', and 'should', 'right' and 'wrong'. 2 7
In this sense, laws are made 'non-optional or obligatory' through an
internal statement of duty or obligation resulting from its direct or
indirect acceptance as a common standard of behaviour. Accordingly,
obedience generally results from an internal recognition of the law as an
accepted social standard-i.e., members of a society will generally
choose to obey the law if it is accepted and viewed internally as a
standard for how one 'ought', 'must', or 'should' behave, or what it is
'right' and 'wrong' to do. Hart maintains that some members may still
choose to disobey a law that is accepted if the social pressure is weak,
however it remains a standard for how they 'ought' or 'should' behave;
'[t]here is no contradiction in saying that people accept certain rules but
experience no such feelings of compulsion.' 2 8
Hart explicitly qualifies the question of obedience-expressed
critically through the normative terminology of 'ought', 'must', and
'should', rather than merely expressed out of disrespect for accepted rules
of conduct-as a moral.29 Questions such as 'Am I to do this evil thing?'
or 'This is law but too iniquitous to obey or apply?' require that the legal
subject pass a moral judgment regarding the law's desirability as a
standard of conduct. This necessarily presupposes a capacity for moral
reasoning, which must be used to critically reflect on whether a particular
law 'should' be obeyed. In this sense, the internal viewpoint-i.e., the
critical reflective attitude towards certain standards of behaviour-is
essentially a moral consideration.
Having differentiated between the idea of a rule and the simple
based on different motives and considerations (Hart, Concept of Law (n 1) 198), and
that a number of laws may not be morally justified, the law itself cannot be too
iniquitous to obey, and therefore valid law cannot be immoral. It is in this sense that
there exists a necessary connection between law and morality.
27 Hart, Concept ofLaw (n 1) 210 57.
28 ibid.
29 ibid 211.
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elements of commands and habits, Hart maintains that only the former
can account for many of the important features of a legal system. More
specifically, the notion of an accepted rule of recognition is required for
an understanding of the foundations of a legal system and the idea of
legal validity. 30 This reflects the empirical and conceptual ultimacy of the
rule in Hart's concept of law. As the first step from the pre-legal into the
legal world, it both necessarily precludes and is presupposed by the other
secondary rules, and provides for the identification of primary rules.31
As indicated in the previous section, Hart introduces the rule of
recognition in order to remedy the defect of uncertainty in primitive
social structures. Doubts as to what the rules are or as to the precise scope
of some given rule are dispelled when an accepted rule of recognition
specifies what constitutes valid law.3 2 For this reason, the rule of
recognition itself 'can neither be valid nor invalid but is simply
accepted.' 3 3 It is not stated, but instead 'its existence is shown in the way
in which particular rules are identified, either by courts or other officials
or private persons or their advisers.'3 4 According to Hart, 'the ultimate
rule of recognition may be regarded from two points of view: one is
expressed in the external statement of fact that the rule exists in the actual
practice of the system; the other is expressed in the internal statements of
validity made by those who use it in identifying the law.' 3 5
Assessed in relation to the moral character of the internal
perspective, this conception of the rule of recognition is necessarily
moral. As mentioned, questions such as 'Am I to do this evil thing?' or
'This is law but too iniquitous to obey or apply?' presuppose the moral
character of the internal viewpoint by requiring a moral judgment of the
law's desirability as a standard of conduct. This permits the legal subject
to decide whether the law 'should' be used (i.e. obeyed). As a result, the
acceptance of a rule, which is necessarily shown through its use as a
standard of behaviour, depends on a moral assessment of whether or not
it 'should' be used as a standard of conduct. In order for it to exist as 'an
30 ibid 202.
31 ibid 91-96.
32 ibid 100-107.
33 ibid 109.
34 ibid 101.
35 ibid 112.
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external statement of the fact that a certain mode of behaviour was
generally accepted' or for its existence to be 'shown in the way in which
particular rules are identified,' the rule of recognition cannot logically
have been deemed 'too iniquitous to obey or apply.' 36 Unless Hart rejects
the internal aspect and assumes that laws are either habitual congruencies
or orders backed by threats, the rule of recognition must have conformed
to society's general conception of morality in order to become generally
accepted.
This finding is also supported by Hart's assessment of morality in
pre-legal societies. Again, he assumes the inherent capacity for moral
reason by maintaining that accepted rules of obligation likely reflected
society's morals; 'at that stage [in which primary rules of obligation were
the only means of social control] there might be nothing corresponding to
the clear distinction made, in more developed societies, between legal and
moral rules.'37 In the absence of a rule stating what the law is, members
of a social group must act according to what they believe the law out to
be. Given that its own existence as the first step from the pre-legal into
the legal world is nothing more than 'an external statement of thefact that
a certain mode of behaviour was generally accepted as a standard of
practice,' the rule of recognition will necessarily reflect what the law
ought to be in determining what may be considered valid law. 38 Given
that the validity of law is an internal statement itself recognizing and
utilizing the criteria set out in the rule of recognition, Hart links the
validity of all law to morality.
In brief, unless one chooses to acknowledge the suppositions of
command theory - that is, that law is nothing more than habitual
congruencies or the command of a supreme sovereign-or to refute the
human capacity for moral reason, one must assume that the ultimate rule
of recognition is an external statement of fact relating to societies internal
perspective of what the law ought to be. Accordingly, the inclusion of the
internal perspective as a necessary aspect of law entails a connection
between law and morality. Otherwise, what law is and what law ought to
be become synonymous under a merely external viewpoint. This does not
36 ibid 101, 110, 210.
37 ibid 169.
38 ibid 110.
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reflect the reality of how individuals assess the law or their actions in
relation to the law.
2. Requirements under the Primary Rules of Obligation Conflict
with Hart's Conception of a Law too Iniquitous to Obey
According to Hart, the word 'law' can be 'properly' used in the absence
of secondary rules, however they cannot exist in the absence of primary
rules of obligation (ex., customs, primitive law and international law).
Law exists where 'human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or
obligatory' (i.e., the legal subject must in some sense feel bound by
primary rules of obligation that restrict certain types of conduct).39
Indeed, Hart quite explicitly states that his own concept of law remains
premised on the idea of a necessary obligation:
It will be recalled that the theory of law as coercive orders, notwithstanding its
errors, started from the perfectly correct appreciation of the fact that where
there is law, there human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or
obligatory. In choosing this starting point the theory was well inspired, and in
building up a new account of law in terms of the interplay of primary and
secondary rules we too shall start from the same idea.40
Hart characterizes the idea obligation in three ways: (1) '[T]he insistence
on importance or seriousness of social pressure behind the rules is the
primary factor determining whether they are thought of as giving rise to
obligations.'41 (2) 'The rules supported by this serious pressure are
thought important because they are believed to be necessary to the
maintenance of social life or some highly prized feature of it.' 42 (3) '[T]he
conduct required by these rules may, while benefiting others, conflict
with what the person who owes the duty may wish to do.' 4 3 In addition,
Hart states that a society of primary rules of obligation 'must contain in
some form restrictions on the free use of violence, theft, and deception,'
which must be generally accepted by the majority in order to ensure
sufficient social pressure.44 Finally, the internal aspect of rules requires
39 ibid 82.
40 ibid.
41 ibid 87.
42 ibid (emphasis added).
43 ibid.
44 ibid 91-92.
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that these feelings be displayed in criticism (including self-criticism) of
members through a 'use [of] the rules as standards for the appraisal of
their own and others' behaviour.'45
This provides for a second much simpler, although no less
important, criticism of Hart's concept of law. In his attempt to distinguish
between law and morality, Hart provides the legal subject with a critical
standard for the assessment of valid law. He states that 'the certification
of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of
obedience, and that, however great the aura of majesty or authority which
the official system may have, its demands in the end must be submitted to
moral scrutiny.'4 6 This is also maintained in Hart's explicit assertion that
the question of obedience-expressed in 'ought', 'must', and 'should',
rather than the mere refusal to comply with accepted rules of conduct-is
47
a moral one.
As a result, every law is subject to moral scrutiny and may be
justifiably disobeyed, by questioning, 'Am I to do this evil thing?' or
'This is law but too iniquitous to obey or apply?' In fact, in a separate
though related article, Hart maintains that a morally iniquitous law may
not only be justifiably disobeyed, but that disobedience may have been
legally required under the precepts of ex post facto law. Adhering to his
claim that wicked law is still valid law, Hart rejects the idea an individual
can be prosecuted for an act that was committed under a law that is
invalidated by wicked character. Instead, the courts-who, from the
internal viewpoint, use commonly accepted standards of correct in
identifying the rules of a system-might punish the individual 'under a
new retrospective law and declare overtly that we [those who did not
disobey the wicked law] were doing something inconsistent with our
principles.' 4 8
This is problematic for a number of reasons. For one, an ex post
facto law in which the wicked acts are made punishable because they
were 'inconsistent with our principles' is necessarily an invalidation of
wicked laws for moral reasons. The assumption that a court, in adopting
the internal viewpoint, would recognize that immoral acts are inconsistent
45 ibid 98.
46 ibid 210.
47 ibid 211.
48 Hart, 'Separation of Law and Morals' (n 3) 620.
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with society's principles, and should therefore be legally reprimanded
despite its formal legality, inherently presupposes a moral judgement on
the acceptance of a wicked law as a standard. In addition, the inconsistent
use of moral principles as standards for accepted conduct fails to remedy
the defect of uncertainty. The idea that a wicked law could remain law
despite its immorality, but that 'legal' acts could then be prosecuted under
a new law that repeals the former for being 'inconsistent with our
[presumably moral] principles' is inherently flawed as it assumes a moral
rule of recognition, yet defends the validity of wicked law.
Most importantly, if all law is subject to moral scrutiny and may be
justifiably (and sometimes even necessarily) disobeyed, how is it made in
any sense 'non-optional or obligatory' unless valid legal obligations are
necessarily also moral? In his concept of law, Hart maintains that human
beings are not 'free to do what they want,' but that 'are required to do or
abstain from certain actions.' 49 However, human beings are only really
required to do or abstain from certain actions if they accord with morality.
As a result, law without morality does not impose any duty that is either
'non-optional or obligatory.' This reality is already reflected in Hart's
assessment; the only rules of obligation he has recognized as absolutely
necessary for the existence of law are those relating to the generally
accepted moral restrictions on 'the free use of violence, theft, and
deception to which human beings are tempted but which they must, in
general, repress, if they are to coexist in close proximity to each other.'5 0
For this reason, the validity of a law necessarily relates to morality.
Unless Hart separates his concept of law from the general idea of
obligation, valid law cannot be 'too iniquitous to obey.' The general idea
of obligation, as it relates to the notion of a rule, entails that individuals
are in some sense restricted by the rule, and that 'deviations from them
are not merely grounds for a prediction that hostile reactions will follow
or that a court will apply sanctions to those who break them, but are also
a reason or justification for such reaction and for applying sanctions.' 5'
However, Hart's moral question of obedience, as well as his idea for the
ex post facto legal sanctioning of wicked legal acts, implies that
ibid 81, 87.
50 ibid 91.
51 ibid 84.
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individuals are only restricted by, and bound to, morality obligations.
This is generally inconsistent with the precepts of the separation thesis.
D. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to defend the conceptual gap between law and morality,
Hart develops a theory of law that rejects the possibility of their necessary
connection. He admittedly does so for moral reasons, aiming to counter
the pervasive effects of wicked law. As a result, his theory of law as a
system of rules purposefully seeks to refute the ideas of habit and
coercion in order to provide for the internal aspect of law, while also
insisting on the positivist separation between what law is and what law
ought to be. Despite a thorough justification for this distinction, Hart's
attempt is not convincing. His reasoning is logically inconsistent, and
often confuses the existence of a separation with the desire for one. As
Fuller aptly remarks, it is unclear 'whether in Professor Hart's own
thinking the distinction between law and morality simply 'is,' or is
something that 'ought to be'.' 52
As I have shown, it is clear that the distinction between law and
morality has not been proven as one that simply 'is.' If the use of a
particular law as an accepted standard of conduct is subject to moral
questions of obedience, internal statements of acceptance and validity
necessarily reflect the morality of the internal viewpoint. Provided that
Hart yields to his theory of law as a system of rules, the assumed moral
character of the internal viewpoint indicates that an accepted rule of
recognition must generally reflect society's view of what the law ought to
be. In addition, the general idea of obligation cannot logically exist under
a theory of valid law that is 'too iniquitous to obey,' therefore a correct
understanding of amoral legal obligations must either reject the internal
viewpoint in favour of the external view of obligation through habits and
commands, or reject the capacity for moral reason. However, neither of
these reflects the reality of how individuals assess the law or their actions
in relation to it.
Neither should the distinction between law and morality be
understood as one that 'ought to be.' It is not a desirability given the
issues of uncertainty, as well as the overall problems of inconsistency and
52 Fuller (n 6) 631.
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absurdity of a valid law 'too iniquitous to obey.' Of course, these
problems are remedied through an amoral understanding of acceptance
and obedience, however this would be even less desirable and, again,
does not reflect the reality of how individuals assess the law or their
actions in relation to it.
For these reasons, a moral concept of law is both more logical and
more desirable than either Austin or Hart's concepts of law. Hart
mistakenly assumes that a necessary connection between valid law and
morality would equate morality with law. As a result, he argues that the
separation thesis is the most effective way to ensure that law-what the
law is-is assessed in relation to morality-what the law ought to be. Not
only would a moral understanding of legal validity also maintain a
distinction between moral and legal rules, it would also more effectively
provide for a moral assessment of the law. By bridging the gap between
law and morality, the latter is given hierarchical supremacy. This would
likely make men readier to disobey wicked law be eliminating the
pressures associated with legal rules, namely the more severe sanctions
and the aura of authority caused by the official institutionalization of
law. 53
53 Hart, Concept ofLaw (n 1) 86, 169-170.
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